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ABSTRACT
Using Secure Real-time Padding Protocol
to Secure Voice-over-IP from Trac Analysis Attacks. (May 2011)
Saswat Mohanty, B.Tech., National Institute of Technology Silchar
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Riccardo Bettati
Voice Over IP (VoIP) systems and transmission technologies have now become
the norm for many communications applications. However, whether they are used
for personal communication or priority business conferences and talks, privacy and
condentiality of the communication is of utmost priority. The present industry
standard is to encrypt VoIP calls using Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP),
aided by ZRTP, but this methodology remains vulnerable to trac analysis attacks,
some of which utilize the length of the encrypted packets to infer the language and
spoken phrases of the conversation.
Secure Real-time Padding Protocol (SRPP) is a new RTP prole which pads all
VoIP sessions in a unique way to thwart trac analysis attacks on encrypted calls. It
pads every RTP or SRTP packet to a predened packet size, adds dummy packets at
the end of every burst in a controllable way, adds dummy bursts to hide silence spurts,
and hides information about the packet inter-arrival timings. This thesis discusses
a few practical approaches and a theoretical optimization approach to packet size
padding. SRPP has been implemented in the form of a library, libSRPP, for VoIP
application developers and as an application, SQRKal, for regular users. SQRKal
also serves as an extensive platform for implementation and verication of new packet
padding techniques.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Voice Over IP (VoIP) systems and applications have now become the norm of low-cost
and business communications, and are used extensively for both personal and priority
business conferences and talks. Privacy and condentiality of the communication is
of utmost priority, and the present industry standard is to encrypt VoIP calls using
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [4], aided by ZRTP [5, 7].
However, encrypted VoIP trac remains vulnerable to trac analysis attacks.
For example, Variable Bit Rate (VBR) codecs like Speex [13] encode the VoIP con-
versation in a way that the size of each packet formed is directly dependent on the
sound or phoneme it encodes. This information is carried over even when SRTP is
used to encrypt the packets, and an intelligent adversary can use the packet size dis-
tributions to accurately infer information about the conversation. Wright et al. [1]
describe techniques to monitor packet sizes and safely deduce the phrases spoken in a
VBR-encoded conversation by an average of 50% and sometimes by as much as 90%.
Similarly, the same team reports that the language spoken in such an encrypted VoIP
call can also be determined by an accuracy of as much as 90% [2].
Unlike VBR codecs, Constant Bit Rate (CBR) codecs encode all the phonemes
in a VoIP conversation at a constant bit rate, and all the VoIP packets are of similar
sizes. So packet sizes of CBR-encoded conversation do not leak any extra information.
However, it is still possible to infer information from such voice streams. For example,
Lella and Bettati [12] utilize silence suppression packets, which are of smaller size and
higher inter-arrival times than the regular packets, to identify talk spurt boundaries
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2in a Google Talk conversation. A simple context-unaware Bayesian classier and
a context-aware Hidden Markov Model (HMM) classier are used to classify these
isolated talk spurts, and both these classiers can eectively determine the spoken
phrases in a conversation, if the accurate talk spurt lengths are known.
There is no single eective approach to thwart all the trac analysis attack
techniques, because each technique utilizes a specic property of the network packet
or the packet stream to extract information. For example, Wright et al. [1, 2] describe
how the eectiveness of their attack methods can be reduced by appropriately padding
the size of individual packets. Zimmermann et al. [5] point out that the use of
techniques like variable VAD (Voice Activity Detection) hangover in VBR (Variable
Bit Rate) codecs can help in mitigating such attacks. The silence-suppression based
approach against CBR-encoded trac [12] can be thwarted by intelligently adding
extra dummy packets in the current talk spurt and extra bursts of packets in the
silence period.
In this thesis, we design a framework for incorporating trac padding into real-
time multimedia streams. As an implementation venue, we design and develop Secure
Real-time Padding Protocol (SRPP), a new Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [3]
prole that incorporates the above suggestions and pads all VoIP sessions in a unique
way to thwart trac analysis attacks on encrypted calls. SRPP pads every RTP
packet to a predened packet size, adds dummy packets at the end of every burst in
a controllable way, adds dummy bursts to hide silence spurts, and hides information
about the packet inter-arrival timings. Importantly, SRPP will serve as an extensible
platform, where one can add dierent padding techniques to mask any property used
in a new trac analysis attack, in order to reduce the eectiveness of the attack. We
have implemented SRPP in the form of a library libSRPP and a standalone software
3application SQRKal. VoIP application developers can use libSRPP to incorporate
the SRPP prole in their applications and SQRKal can be used by regular users to
secure their voice calls.
This thesis has been organized as follows: Chapter II discusses the criteria re-
quired for a countermeasure against VoIP trac analysis to be eective. In Chapter
III, we discuss a few existing work related to this thesis. Chapter IV describes the
general working of a VoIP application and the design details of SRPP. In Chapter
V, we talk about the implementation of libSRPP and SQRKal. Chapter VI presents
the evaluation of eectiveness, eciency and correct functioning of SRPP. It also
discusses a mathematical approach to nd the optimal technique of padding packets.
Finally, we conclude and discuss future work for this thesis in Chapter VII.
4CHAPTER II
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST VOIP TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
In a regular two-party Voice-over-IP call, we have a single sender and a single receiver.
Any passive attacker will listen on the wire to capture all the media packets. If the
packet contents are encrypted, the attacker has access only to the header and the
encrypted payload. She can utilize a property of the encrypted packet, like the packet
size, or a property of the session, like burst lengths or packet inter-arrival timings, to
infer information about the VoIP call.
Timing based analysis attacks are used to identify or separate a packet ow
from the output of an anonymizer or a trac mix. Anonymizers or mixes, originally
proposed by Chaum [15], provide anonymity by batching input packets from multiple
sources to hide the correspondence between the input packet ow and the output
packet ow. In a Timed Mix, all queued packets are forwarded after a periodic
timeout. In a threshold mix, all queued packets are forwarded when the queue size
surpasses a threshold. A continuous-time mix adds a random delay to each input
packet, and thus disturbs the timing pattern of the original packet ow.
A type of timing based analysis attacks, called Flow Detection attacks, measure
the similarity between the timing information of the input packet ow and multiple
output packet ows to determine the output path or the receiver corresponding to the
input packet ow. Similarity between the timing information of the packet ows is
measured using probabilistic measures like correlation or information theoretic mea-
sures such as mutual information. If the input and output packet timing are specied
using random variables X and Y, the correlation between X and Y gives the degree of
similarity between X and Y. Mutual information signies the amount of information
given about X, if Y is known. Another model of timing based analysis attacks, called
5Flow Separation attacks, uses techniques like Blind Source Separation to segregate
each unique packet ow from the output of various mixes, in order to identify multiple
call ows and the receivers. Blind Source Separation technique is a statistical signal
processing method used to recover sources of a signal from observed mixtures.
A popular countermeasure against trac analysis attacks is link padding, where
additional packet frames are added to the original trac at the link level of the
source network stack. This ensures the presence of a cover trac which obfuscates
the original network trac [9, 16]. Various link padding algorithms are available for
specic trac patterns. Some of these techniques suer from inecient utilization
of the network bandwidth. Trac morphing [8] applies convex optimization tech-
niques to determine the output packet size distributions for a given input packet size
distribution, and alter the packet size of the input packet accordingly.
In this thesis, we focus on padding the original trac by modifying the packet
sizes, burst lengths and packet inter-arrival timings for VoIP trac to thwart trac
analysis attacks like timing based analysis attacks. Since these properties of the trac
are modied at the source, the attacker on the network does not have access to the
original packet property and hence ow separation or ow detection analysis on the
network will produce inaccurate results for the attacker.
For any solution against trac analysis attacks on VoIP trac to be eective, it
must satisfy a number of criteria:
First, a countermeasure must be eective in padding VoIP packets, such that the
original packet size cannot be inferred from the padded packet. A possible approach
is to ensure that the mutual information between the output packet size distribution
and input packet size distribution is minimum.
Second, it must be bandwidth ecient, so that the network does not get congested.
6Moreover, the countermeasure must ensure that it does not increase the latency of the
VoIP conversation due to the processing time required for padding and unpadding.
Next, the implementation must be easily deployable and must have an intuitive in-
terface for the user, so that it is very easy to use. Likewise, it must have an easily
interpretable API so that application developers can utilize, extend or customize it
with little eort. Portability to dierent platforms is also an important feature.
Finally, any implementation of such a countermeasure must be scalable with respect
to the load and network size. It must be resilient enough to perform eciently, when
the user makes many calls at the same time or in case of a conference call with many
participants.
A. Padding Mechanisms
Any countermeasure against trac analysis of encrypted content has to focus on
perturbing the visible aspects of the message exchange, such as packet lengths, packet
timing and talk spurt lengths. We propose a combination of the following four basic
mechanisms:
1. Packet-size Padding (PSP)
Many trac analysis attacks exploit the packet size information. For example,
Wright et al. [1, 2] use the packet size distribution to nd the phrases and lan-
guage spoken in VoIP ows. This type of attack can be mitigated by padding
packets to dierent packet sizes than the original size. This is done by adding
dummy information at the end of a packet. The challenge for the implementa-
tion of such a design is to obfuscate the padding information. Fig. 1 depicts
the mechanism for Packet-size Padding.
7Fig. 1. Packet-size Padding (PSP)
2. Current-burst Padding (CBP)
Some trac analysis attacks utilize the length of a talk spurt in a VoIP call
to estimate the spoken phrase in a VoIP conversation. So, the current burst
length must be obfuscated by adding certain number of dummy packets after
every packet burst. The number of dummy packets sent after every packet
burst should typically depend on the burst length or talk spurt length. The
longer the packet burst, the fewer the extra number of dummy packets sent.
The shorter the packet burst, the higher the probability that the packet burst
will be mapped to a corresponding phrase, and hence these packet bursts must
be padded with more dummy packets to confuse the interceptor. Fig. 2 depicts
this technique of padding current bursts.
Fig. 2. Current-burst Padding (CBP)
83. Extra-burst Padding (EBP)
Trac analysis may be able to infer information from inter-burst timings as well.
It is, therefore, often benecial to "break" long intervals of silence with occa-
sional bursts of dummy packets, as depicted in Fig. 3. This will thwart timing
analysis attacks which utilize the silence information of a VoIP conversation.
Fig. 3. Extra-burst Padding (EBP)
4. Variable Inter-arrival Time Padding (VITP)
A large class of trac analysis attacks exploit information about the inter-
packet timings of a ow, as described in Chapter II. Many attacks on anonymity
networks, for example, measure and correlate inter-packet time information to
infer communication exchanged [10]. In order to mask the actual inter-arrival
timing information of the RTP packets, a countermeasure has to add its own
element of stochasticity to the inter-arrival time by selectively delaying each
VoIP packet. Fig 4. depicts this mechanism.
Care must be taken to avoid addition of extra latency to the packet. If the
maximum permissible delay for a RTP packet to be sent on the network is X
ms, and the current packet was received after Y ms of the last packet, then a
random small delay of R ms can be added to the packet, where R  f0, X-Yg ms.
The maximum latency of a VoIP packet is widely considered to be 150ms, which
must include the network delay. The maximum permissible delay represented
9by X is a design parameter, whose optimal value must be empirically determined
in the evaluation phase of any new padding algorithm.
Fig. 4. Variable Inter-arrival Time Padding (VITP)
As a countermeasure, Secure Real-time Padding Protocol (SRPP) must satisfy
all the above criteria and support the application of any combination of these four
padding techniques.
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CHAPTER III
RELATED WORK
Several papers have proposed and implemented various trac analysis techniques
against network trac. Some papers dene countermeasures against such trac anal-
ysis attacks. Wright et al. [8] propose a novel technique of using convex optimization
to morph a given trac characteristic distribution into a dierent distribution. Given
constraints on a real trac pattern such as packet size distribution, a desired trac
pattern and trac constraints, they determine an optimal morphing matrix, whose
entities represent the probability of altering a packet with a given input size to a
particular output size. For every input packet with a given size, a corresponding
output packet with a dierent packet size is sampled from the matrix, and the packet
is padded accordingly. They show that using this technique, they can reduce the
eciency of their earlier classier [1, 2] to as less as 30%. Secure Real-time Padding
Protocol (SRPP) can serve as a platform to eciently implement and use such a
morphing or padding algorithm in real time.
Danezis [10] describes statistical trac analysis attacks based on ow correlation
in continuous-time trac mixes. This paper, along with several others [17, 14], shows
the importance of information-theoretic properties like entropy in trac analysis at-
tacks on mix trac, and motivates looking at optimal obfuscation of information-
theoretic properties to thwart trac analysis attacks. In SRPP, we will look at using
information-theoretic techniques to optimize packet padding.
Guan et al. developed NetCamo [9] as a countermeasure against trac analysis
with strict quality-of-service bounds. Their system provides trac analysis resistance
by inserting padding frames at the link level and rerouting packets to confuse the at-
tacker. NetCamo provides link padding with constant time interval, link padding with
11
variable time interval and link padding using parasite ows as cover trac to emulate
other network packet trac. In SRPP, we pad packets at the application level, and
also give utmost importance to bandwidth eciency as an evaluation criterion.
Wang et al. [11] present a dependent link padding algorithm which uses minimum
sending rate to provide adequate dummy trac to thwart trac analysis attacks.
Dummy packet frames are added at the link level depending on the input packet
ow. Every dummy packet is scheduled according to the availability of input packet
frames, such that the sending rate of the dummy trac is as minimum as possible,
thereby utilizing less network bandwidth. This algorithm can also be used and tested
as part of SRPP. As is mentioned in the paper, this technique is not very scalable,
since the rate increases with more user ows and longer sessions, and that leads to
more dummy trac and higher latency.
Our work builds on these approaches and prepares a platform to implement cer-
tain trac padding techniques to thwart certain trac analysis attacks on encrypted
VoIP trac. Secure Real-time Padding Protocol is designed to be extensible for ap-
plication of any new padding technique and implementable in any VoIP application.
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CHAPTER IV
SECURE REAL-TIME PADDING PROTOCOL
A. Architecture of VoIP Systems
A general two-party VoIP call involves the following phases of a call ow:
 Signaling Phase: This phase controls the creation, modication and termina-
tion of two-party VoIP calls, and is done in the following steps:
{ Connection Establishment: A call is setup using a signaling protocol
like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [6], H.323 or Inter-Asterisk Exchange
(IAX). This involves the sender inviting the receiver for a call and the
receiver acknowledging and accepting/rejecting the request.
{ Parameter Negotiation: The sender and the receiver negotiate the
use of various parameters like supported codecs, protocols and applica-
tion/session keys, and agree upon the parameters for the ensuing call
session. Most applications use techniques such as Secure DEScriptions
(SDES) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) for parameter negotia-
tion.
 Media Transfer phase: After the signaling is complete between the source
and destination endpoints, the actual call is placed and media is transferred
continuously between them. This involves sending packetized audio data from
the sender to the receiver and vice versa. Fig 5. depicts the data ow at the
sender side of a typical VoIP application.
{ Voice Encoding: At the sender side, voice input from the input device is
rst encoded by an appropriate audio codec. An audio codec compresses
13
Fig. 5. Data Flow Diagram for Media Transfer Phase of a General VoIP call
and encodes digital audio data, so that it uses less storage space and band-
width required for transmission over the network. If the codec encodes at
a constant bit rate, it is called a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) codec, while a
Variable Bit Rate (VBR) codec compresses audio data with a varying bit
rate.
{ Media Transport Layer: The compressed data is then packetized into
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) packets. RTP is used as a transport
protocol for audio and video data, and contains data elds for important
information about the call source and destination, and other media session
parameters.
{ Encryption or Security Layer: RTP packets are then encrypted and
authenticated by the Secure Real-time Transport (SRTP) layer. SRTP
is a standard VoIP encryption protocol, which is part of the RTP set of
protocols or RTP proles. It encrypts the payload of the RTP packet
using the negotiated session key, authenticates the entire packet by adding
an authentication hash to the end of the packet and then forwards these
packets to the underlying transport layer like UDP or TCP for transfer
over the network.
Likewise at the receiver end in the media transfer phase, the transport layer
14
passes SRTP packets to the SRTP layer. The authentication hash is veried
for any potential tampering of the SRTP packet, and then it is decrypted into
a RTP packet. The payload from the RTP packet is then passed on to be
decoded by the corresponding codec, and the voice output is then sent to the
output device. This is a basic working scenario of the protocols and modules
used in VoIP media stacks.
If the signaling phase is completed outside of the media phase and in a dedicated
signaling channel, the type of signaling is called out-of-band signaling. SIP, H.323 and
IAX support out-of-band signaling. If the signaling bits or packets are sent directly
from the call source to the destination in the media channel, it is called in-band or
in-media signaling. ZRTP supports in-band signaling.
It is important to note here that RTP and SIP are the most popular combination
of signaling and media protocols respectively. However, there are many more signal-
ing and media protocols which are used in VoIP applications. There are many other
assisting protocols like IAX, Real-time Streaming Protocol (RTSP), and Transport
Layer Security (TLS) etc. There are applications which implement session layer en-
cryption like Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) instead of using SRTP. Skype implements its
own proprietary encryption protocol. An unconrmed statistics from the year 2008
pointed out that only about 17% of VoIP applications implement any kind of encryp-
tion. However, since SIP, RTP and SRTP are the most popularly used combination
of VoIP protocols for generating encrypted VoIP trac, we have considered this for
our work.
15
B. SRPP Design Details
As a countermeasure to VoIP trac analysis, SRPP must satisfy all the criteria and
support all the padding techniques described in Chapter II. To ensure compatibility
with existing VoIP protocols and standards, SRPP has to be implemented as a new
RTP prole, so that it can be added to the family of RTP-based protocols. In order to
be utilized by developers of VoIP applications, SRPP must be provided in the form
of a library libSRPP, which can be easily integrated in any new VoIP application
as a bump-in-the-stack module. Moreover, to ensure compatibility with legacy VoIP
systems, SRPP must be implemented as a standalone application called SQRKal to be
used by regular users. SQRKal must be able to serve as a bump-in-the-wire module,
discover any call sessions started by the legacy VoIP application and apply SRPP
padding to the media session for the entire call.
1. Analysis of SRPP Design Types
Based on the requirements, a design decision has to be made about the location of
SRPP in the VoIP protocol stack. Fig. 6 depicts the dierent types of implementation
designs for SRPP protocol.
 Type-I Implementation: SRPP is placed between the encoding and pack-
etization layer. In such a scenario, the voice input from the input device at
the sender endpoint is encoded by a voice codec and this encoded audio data is
padded using SRPP. Packet-Size Padding (PSP) can be implemented by adding
dummy data to the encoded audio data, Current-Burst Padding (CBP) can be
performed by adding dummy data at the end of a burst of encoded audio data
and Extra-Burst Padding (EBP) can be applied similarly by inserting dummy
encoded data when there is extended silence. These padded bytes of encoded
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Fig. 6. Types of Design of SRPP
audio data can then be packetized, encrypted and transported over the network.
Pros
{ It is easy to implement since we do not need to handle any form of encryp-
tion.
{ libSRPP library package will be lightweight and easily integrable with
existing and new applications.
{ Minimal signaling is required.
Cons
{ The biggest issue with this design is that SQRKal cannot be implemented
using this architecture. Since it is a bump-in-the-wire implementation,
RTP packets are received from the original VoIP application and the only
way to apply SRPP padding in such a design is to extract the audio data
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from the input RTP packet, pad this data using SRPP, form a new RTP
packet for the padded data, and send it to the destination. There is extra
overhead due to increased processing per packet.
 Type-II Implementation: SRPP is placed after the encryption layer. In
such a scenario, the voice input from the input device at the sender endpoint
is encoded by a voice codec, packetized into RTP packets and encrypted using
SRTP. After that, SRPP applies padding by encapsulating a SRTP packet with
a SRPP Header, and adding extra padding bytes for PSP in the payload of
the SRPP packet. CBP can be implemented by sending extra SRPP packets
at the end of a talk spurt. Likewise, EBP is implemented by sending dummy
SRPP packets in case of extended periods of silence. The SRPP packets are
transported over the network using a transport protocol like UDP or TCP.
Pros
{ This design is perfect for a bump-in-the-wire scenario such as in SQRKal.
Cons
{ The complexity of the implementation is higher since encryption and ad-
dition of new SRPP Headers with new sequence numbers needs to be han-
dled.
{ In case of a bump-in-the-wire implementation, if the original VoIP applica-
tion does not support SRTP, we will receive RTP packets instead of SRTP
packets. Since RTP packets are not authenticated, there exists no need of
encapsulating the entire RTP packet, since only the RTP payload can be
sent in a new SRPP packet. Type-II design should be extended to include
dierent processing for RTP packets.
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 Type-III Implementation: In type-III implementation, the voice input from
the input device at the sender endpoint is encoded by a voice codec and then
packetized into RTP packets. The RTP packets are then padded using SRPP.
The headers of the RTP packet can be stripped o, and only the RTP payload
can be encapsulated using a SRPP Header. PSP can be implemented by adding
dummy data to the payload of the new SRPP packet, while CBP and EBP
can be performed similar to type-II implementation by sending dummy SRPP
packets at the end of a current burst and in case of extended periods of silence
in the VoIP conversation.
Pros
{ Encryption is not required at SRPP layer, since it is handled by SRTP
after SRPP processing is complete.
Cons
{ If this design is used in a bump-in-the-wire scenario and the original VoIP
application sends SRTP packets to SQRKal, SRPP will strip o the SRTP
packet's headers and encapsulate its payload. At the receiver end, the
SRTP packet is reconstructed from the encapsulated SRTP payload inside
the SRPP packet. Since the original SRTP packet was authenticated but
later modied by SRPP, it will be discarded at the receiver end. Thus,
type-III implementation is unfeasible for the case of bump-in-the-wire im-
plementation for SRTP packets.
From the above discussion, it is evident that all the three designs are insucient.
We propose a modied version of type-II implementation to serve as a design for
SRPP. Fig 7 depicts the general data ow in such a design.
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Fig. 7. Data Flow Diagram for SRPP Implementation
SRPP handles the following operations:
 Header Obfuscation
At the sender side, after the voice encoding layer of the media transfer phase
completes its function, the media transport layer packetizes the data into RTP
packets. If the original VoIP application implements the security layer, SRTP is
used to authenticate and encrypt the RTP packet. In such a scenario, the SRPP
layer receives either a RTP or SRTP packet, depending on whether encryption is
used or not. It must obfuscate all the visible properties of the packet to mitigate
trac analysis attacks. If it receives a RTP packet, SRPP reformats it by
updating the sequence number and timestamp elds by a new sequence number
and a current timestamp. Then it appends a SRPP tag consisting of padding
bytes and a dummy ag signifying if the current SRPP packet is a dummy packet
or not. It also contains the sequence number and timestamp of the original
RTP/SRTP packet. This SRPP packet is then encrypted, authenticated and
sent forward to the destination endpoint. Likewise, if the SRPP layer receives a
SRTP packet, it simply encapsulates the SRTP packet in a new SRPP packet.
Since SRTP packets are generally authenticated and its alteration will result in
the receiver discarding the packet, we must encapsulate the entire SRTP packet.
This ensures that we apply Packet-Size Padding to obfuscate the original packet
size, and Extra-Burst Padding and Current-Burst Padding to obfuscate the
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original burst lengths.
 Padding Identication
At the receiver-side SRPP module, the padding bytes and the dummy SRPP
packets need to be identied and the original RTP packet must be reconstructed.
If the dummy ag is set to 1, it signies that the packet is a dummy packet
and must be promptly discarded. The padding bytes are stored in the SRPP
tag, and the pad count signies the number of padding bytes added. Thus,
the original packet is obtained from the received SRPP packet by removing the
padding bytes, and updating the sequence number and timestamp elds with
the original ones present in the SRPP tag. In the case of SRTP packets, the
SRPP module simply retrieves the original SRTP packet from the payload of
the received SRPP packet, and sends it forward to the encryption layer of the
network protocol stack.
 Signaling
Signaling between the sender and receiver is necessary to negotiate the use of
SRPP and the relevant padding parameters. SRPP supports both in-band and
out-of-band signaling. In in-band signaling, signaling messages are sent at the
start of the media phase in the media channel. In case of SRPP, the SRPP
sender module sends a HELLO SRPP message to discover if the other endpoint
has a SRPP implementation. If the receiver supports SRPP, it acknowledges
it by sending a HELLOACK message. The padding parameters, if any, are
negotiated in the HELLO and HELLOACK messages. SRPP session teardown
can be achieved by BYE and BYEACK messages and can be initiated from
either side. This in-band signaling handshake, as shown in g. 8, is perfectly
feasible for both our implementations - SQRKal and libSRPP.
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Fig. 8. In-band Signaling
SRPP also supports out-of-band signaling through SIP/SDP for integration
with an external VoIP application. In out-of-band signaling, signaling messages
are exchanged between the participating endpoints in a dedicated signaling
channel prior to setup of the media phase. These signaling messages carry the
parameters to be negotiated between both the endpoints. SIP/SDP is a pop-
ular out-of-band signaling protocol, where parameters are expressed as SDP
attributes inside SIP messages. To support out-of-band signaling, SRPP pro-
vides SRPP-specic SDP attributes, which are easily extensible and the external
application can embed them directly in its SDP payload.
2. Packet Format
SRPP is a RTP prole and g. 9 represents its packet format.
The design of SRPP yields the following packet structure:
 Header Obfuscation: As described earlier, this is handled by the following
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Fig. 9. SRPP Packet Format
elds:
{ Padding Bytes: Contains the dummy information added to each packet as
part of PSP.
{ Pad Count: Contains the number of padding bytes inserted in the SRPP
packet.
{ SRPP Sequence Number: This is a new Sequence number specic to the
SRPP layer.
{ Payload: This contains the original RTP packet's payload or the entire
original SRTP packet.
{ Original Sequence Number and Timestamp: Contains the sequence num-
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ber and timestamp of the original RTP/SRTP packet, which is required
for the reconstruction of the original packet at the receiver endpoint.
{ As shown in the gure, the payload is encrypted and the whole packet is
authenticated. The authentication hash is attached as the SRPP authen-
tication tag.
 Padding Identication
{ Dummy Flag: It is set to 1 if the SRPP packet is a dummy packet and 0
otherwise.
 SRPP Signaling
{ RTP Extension Field for SRPP Signaling: This eld is used for speci-
fying in-band signaling message types. HELLO, HELLOACK, BYE and
BYEACK SRPP signaling messages are indicated using this eld.
3. Sender and Receiver Algorithms
We consider a simple two-party call between a sender and a receiver. Two SRPP
timers are used for applying certain padding techniques, namely silence timer and
packet timer. Silence timer must re when Extra-Burst Padding (EBP) is required,
and the packet timer must re when Current Burst Padding (CBP) needs to be
applied. In both the padding techniques, a specic number of dummy SRPP pack-
ets are sent to the destination. For every non-dummy SRPP packet, SRPP applies
Packet-Size Padding (PSP) and Variable Inter-arrival Time Padding (VITP).
The owchart for sender-side SRPP operations is depicted by g. 10.
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Fig. 10. Flowchart for Sender-side Operations
For every SRPP packet to be sent to the other endpoint, the following actions
are performed:
 SRPP waits for an event to occur i.e. for any of the timers to re or for a
RTP/SRTP packet to be received.
 If a packet is received, the packet timer and silence timer are reset. SRPP
Padding is applied on the input packet and the new SRPP packet is sent to
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the receiver. This packet is stored in a dummy cache, which serves as a local
cache of sent/received SRPP packets. The dummy cache is used for generating
dummy packets and padding bytes for SRPP packets.
 If the packet or the silence timer res, a number of dummy packets for CBP or
EBP respectively.
 If SRPP has not received any packet and no timers have red, any queued
dummy SRPP packets are sent to the destination.
Fig. 11 shows a owchart representing the receiver-side SRPP process.
For every SRPP packet received from the lower layer, the following actions are per-
formed:
1. The received packet is veried for authentication and decrypted.
2. If the packet is a dummy packet, the packet is discarded.
3. If the packet is a legitimate packet, the original RTP packet is formed by re-
placing Sequence number, Timestamp and Padding bit. It is then unpadded
and the RTP packet is sent to the upper RTP layer.
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Fig. 11. Flowchart for Receiver-side Operations
4. Conference Call and PC-to-phone Scenarios
A conference call involves a mixer and many endpoints, each of which can be a sender
or receiver or both at any instant of time. Fig. 12 shows a RTP/SRTP mixer, a few
senders and a few receivers. The general data ow can be described as:
 The senders send RTP or SRTP packets to the mixer.
 The mixer extracts the voice data from all the senders' packets.
 It then synchronizes all the audio data, repacks them as RTP/SRTP packets
and sends them to all the senders and receivers.
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Fig. 12. Conference Call Scenario
with No SRPP Support
Fig. 13. Conference Call Scenario with
SRPP Support at the Mixer
SRPP is implemented at the individual senders and receivers. In order for a
conference call to be successful, these intermediate devices (mixers) need to support
SRPP as well. Thus, as shown in Fig. 13, for every channel between the senders with
SRPP support and the mixer, there is a SRPP sender module in each such sender
which pads the RTP packets and a SRPP receiver module in the mixer which unpads
the SRPP packets to get the original RTP packets. So the mixer is able to extract
the voice data, perform its usual functions and generate the nal RTP packet stream
that is broadcasted to all the participants. Thus, the SRPP sender module in the
mixer pads the packets and sends it to each participant. The participants unpad the
packets and the VoIP media transfer is successful.
For senders which do not support SRPP, the mixer will still be able to receive
the RTP/SRTP packets since SRPP signaling for these sessions will inform the mixer
not to apply SRPP padding for those connections. Thus SRPP can be supported in
conference calls or multicast scenarios. The mixer needs to keep a maximum of two
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SRPP sessions per participant-one for receiving data and another for sending data.
This increases load on the mixer and could be a possible point-of-failure in the design.
A similar scenario arises in the case of translators or Public Switch Telephone
Network (PSTN) gateways. PC-to-phone can be eectively padded using SRPP only
if there is support for SRPP at the translator or gateway. This is shown in the
following gure.
Fig. 14. PC-to-phone Call Scenario When [a] SRPP is Not Supported and [b] SRPP
is Supported
When SRPP is not supported in the gateway or translator, the call is completed
but the media is not padded using SRPP and is susceptible to trac analysis attacks.
Fig. 14 [b] shows the case when SRPP is supported at the PC or computer and
at the PSTN gateway. In this case, the communication between the PC and the
gateway are padded successfully using SRPP. Thus, the support for SRPP at the
intermediate devices like translators and mixers is not mandatory for a successful
call, but is recommended in order to apply SRPP padding for a secure call.
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CHAPTER V
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
A. Implementation Details
The library libSRPP and the standalone application SQRKal were implemented on
the Ubuntu Linux v10.04 platform. The primary programming language used was
C++. libSRPP API and the daemon process for SQRKal are written in C++, while
the GUI for SQRKal has been designed in Java. Numerous other perl and bash scripts
were used for various purposes throughout the project. The development environment
comprised of Eclipse IDE CDT with Subeclipse and Doxygen plugins. Subversion,
through a google code repository, was used for version control.
1. Implementation of libSRPP
The library libSRPP has the following major functions:
 Convert a RTP Packet to SRPP packet and vice versa
 Convert a SRTP Packet to SRPP packet and vice versa
 Apply dierent padding mechanisms
 Send and receive a SRPP Message
 Perform In-Band Signaling
To perform each of these important functionalities, libSRPP was implemented
using the following major classes:
1. SRPPMessage
This class contains information about the packet format of SRPP. It imple-
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ments all the functionalities pertaining to each SRPP Message like encrypting
or decrypting a SRPP message, converting a SRPP packet from network order
to SRPPMessage form and vice versa.
2. SRPPSession
A SRPP Session comprises primarily of information about the two VoIP end-
points, the RTP port used, Sequence Number of the packets, maximum packet
size and the negotiated key. These information are stored in an object of
SRPPSession class. It needs to be started every time a new RTP or SRTP
Session is discovered or started.
3. Signaling Functions
This class is responsible for in-band signaling in SRPP. It implements the state
machine for handling of SRPP signaling message. The major functions are
sendHello, sendHelloAck, receiveHello and receiveHelloAck. This class is also
called to receive information about the current state of SRPP Signaling.
4. Padding Functions
Padding Functions handles the basic padding functionalities like pad, unpad,
store a packet in dummy cache, prepare a dummy packet and get dummy data.
These functions are widely used throughout libSRPP while padding a RTP or
SRTP packet to SRPP packet or vice versa.
5. Padding Algorithms
This class contains the implementations of all the padding algorithms like max-
random, full bandwidth etc. These algorithms are described in the next sec-
tion. All the padding algorithms belong to the category of Current-Burst
Padding, Packet-Size Padding, Extra-Burst Padding or Variable Inter-arrival
31
Time Padding. This class must be extended to include new padding algorithms.
6. RTPHeader and SRTPHeader
These two classes, as the name suggests, store the information about the header
structures of a RTP and SRTP packet respectively.
7. sdp srpp
This class contains the important signaling information, which are necessary to
be negotiated before SRPP padding is started. These involve basic signaling
parameters like maxpayloadsize and key. This is primarily used for out-of-band
signaling to easily integrate it in SIP/SDP oer/answer model.
8. SRPP Functions
SRPP Functions is the backbone and the most important interface of libSRPP,
since it implements all the functions which are to be mostly used by a user
of libSRPP. These include functions like rtp to srpp, srpp to rtp, srtp to srpp,
srpp to srtp, create srpp message, create and encrypt srpp message, send message
and receive message.
These classes form the library libSRPP. Any VoIP application can utilize it to
incorporate the SRPP prole in his/her application.
Major functions of the libSRPP API are listed in Appendix A.
2. Padding Algorithms
A few padding algorithms have been implemented as part of SRPP. They are described
as follows:
 Max-Random
The output packet size is a random number in the interval [input packet size,
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maximum transmission unit]
 With Burst padding
Current and extra burst padding are applied in order to inject dummy trac
into the stream. The number of dummy packets is a random number at this
point in time.
 Full Bandwidth
The output packet size is equal to the maximum transmission unit. All packets
are padded to the maximum possible packet size and hence the system uses the
maximum possible packet bandwidth.
 Gradual Ascent Padding (GAP)
To minimize excess bandwidth used for padding, the threshold for output packet
size must not be too high. Intuitively, it can be seen that the maximum output
packet size must be set to a low value, and increased gradually as larger input
packets are received. The maximum output packet size is always a randomly
scaled value of the maximum input packet size. In other words, the output
packet size is a random number in the interval [input packet size, r*(maximum
input packet size received so far)], where r is a random number in the interval
[0,5]. If a new packet larger than the maximum output packet size arrives, the
maximum packet size is updated to a scaled value of this input packet size. The
minor problem behind this technique is that every ascent of maximum packet
size gives out information about a large packet coming in. This might help a
passive attacker in certain scenarios.
 Slight Perturbation
This involves padding the input packets to a random size, such that the dif-
33
ference between the input and output packet size is not large. The motivation
behind this algorithm is to make sure that we pad the packets but to a very
small extent, such that the bandwidth utilization is less. This might pose a
problem where an intelligent attacker might be able to infer the original packet
size information based on the correlation between the output packet size and
the input packet size.
These algorithms have been implemented in SRPP and it can be extended to
include newer padding algorithms.
3. Bump-in-the-wire Implementation or SQRKal
SQRKal has been implemented as a bump-in-the-wire design to intercept RTP or
SRTP messages sent by a VoIP application on the local machine and pad the packet
stream. Here, Twinkle [21] has been used as the third-party open-source VoIP ap-
plication for testing purposes. SQRKal has been programmed in C++ as a daemon
process which listens for SIP or RTP messages. SQRKal has its own SIP state ma-
chine to handle incoming and outgoing SIP messages. After parsing the standard
SIP messages INVITE, 200 OK and/or ACK, it stores the information of the ensuing
RTP or SRTP session. The SRPP session is started as soon as the rst RTP or SRTP
packet is sent from or received at the local machine. Throughout the SRPP Session,
every RTP or SRTP message is padded or unpadded accordingly, and then relayed to
the appropriate destination.
Fig. 15 depicts the data ow in the bump-in-the-wire implementation of SRPP.
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Fig. 15. Data Flow in SQRKal
The following steps describe the packet ow path when SQRKal is used:
1. Twinkle sends a SIP/RTP message to the remote machine.
2. It is queued and forwarded to SQRKal.
3. SQRKal processes the packet, creates a new packet with a spoofed header and
sends it forward.
4. This new message is forwarded to the remote machine.
5. Received SIP/RTP Message is queued in the IP queue.
6. The received packet is then forwarded to SQRKal, which processes it as required.
7. The new packet is forwarded to the local machine's SIP/RTP port.
8. Twinkle receives the RTP/SRTP packet with the original payload, and processes
it to receive the audio data.
SQRKal relies heavily on the correct functioning of Netlter's iptables and ip queue
library framework [24]. An implementation related to SQRKal is the fact that it can-
not function correctly if another application on the local machine is using ip queue
library. This is because it is not permissible to have more than one IP queues at the
same time in a system.
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The GUI of SQRKal has been implemented in Java. Fig. 16 shows a screenshot
of SQRKal.
Fig. 16. Screenshot of SQRKal Application
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION
SRPP has been implemented as a library libSRPP and as the application SQRKal.
SQRKal operates in a bump-in-the-wire fashion. We proceed to evaluate these deliv-
erables on the basis of evaluation criteria described earlier in Chapter II.
A. Results from the Bump-in-the-wire Implementation
The operations, eectiveness and eciency of SQRKal as a bump-in-the-wire imple-
mentation is evaluated in this section. The implementation setup using Twinkle VoIP
application and the dierent padding algorithms have been described in Chapter V.
1. Operation
We analyze the functioning of SQRKal in each of the following scenarios: All the
wireshark [20] traces are shown in Appendix C.
 Session where we connect Twinkle to a public music server
This is the case where the sender has SRPP support while the receiver does not
support SRPP. A call is placed from our SIP account in Twinkle to a public
music server at music@iptel.org. The traces verify that SQRKal tries to signal
its presence to the other endpoint at the start of the media session, but it fails.
No packet-level padding is performed, and the session goes on as usual. There
is no degradation in quality.
 Session between two SQRKal supported endpoints implementing Max-Random
algorithm
From the trace, it was veried that the packets are padded to a random size
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less than the maximum packet size i.e. 1500 bytes. It was noted that there is a
slight degradation in the quality of the received audio.
 Session between two SQRKal supported endpoints implementing Full Band-
width algorithm
From the trace, it was veried that all the packets are padded to a random size
exactly equal to 1466 bytes. Quality of the received audio degraded more than
the previous case.
 Session between two SQRKal supported endpoints implementing Gradual As-
cent Padding algorithm
From the trace, it was veried that the packets are initially padded to 150 bytes,
and then the padding size increases as the packet size becomes greater than this
threshold. The quality of received audio was satisfactory.
 Session between two SQRKal supported endpoints implementing Slight Pertur-
bation algorithm
From the trace, it was veried that the packets are padded with small number
of dummy data. The quality of received audio was satisfactory.
 Session between two SQRKal supported endpoints implementing Dummy Bursts
technique
The trace shows that the dummy packets are indistinguishable from the original
packets. It was veried that the endpoints are sending dummy packets as part
of Current Burst Padding and Extra Burst Padding, from the application logs.
The quality degraded slightly.
These sessions were repeated for the case of SRTP, with similar results.
38
2. Eectiveness
The eectiveness of SQRKal can be depicted in the following histogram. It shows
that when SQRKal is not used,the packet sizes for a stream of RTP packets range
between 50 to 80. When SQRKal is used in Gradual Ascent Padding (GAP) mode,
the packets are padded eectively and we see SRPP Packets of sizes ranging between
145 to 220. This proves the eectiveness of SQRKal, as depicted by g. 17.
Fig. 17. Eectiveness of SRPP for RTP Packets
A similar experiment was done for a stream of SRTP packets. The following
gure shows that while the input packet sizes range from 50 to 80, they are eectively
padded to packets of size ranging from 150 to 250. Fig. 18 shows the results for SRTP
packet padding using SRPP.
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Fig. 18. Eectiveness of SRPP for SRTP Packets
3. Eciency
1. Jitter
Formally, jitter is dened as the statistical variance of the RTP packet inter-
arrival timings. In order to quantify the eciency of SQRKal, we ran SQRKal
a number of times for each padding technique and collected traces for each case.
Then, the jitter of the session was calculated using the formula,
Ji = Ji 1 + (j(Ri  Ri 1)  (Si   Si 1)j   Ji 1)=16,
where Ri represents the received time of packet i, Si represents the RTP times-
tamp of the packet signifying the sent time of the packet, Ji represents the
instantaneous jitter for packet i.
If we take the jitter value of the last packet, we get the approximate mean
jitter of the session. This is the standard method of calculation of jitter for
RTP packets. We applied this formula to determine the jitter for every session
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corresponding to each technique. The following graph depicts the average jitter
values for all the padding techniques.
Fig. 19. Mean Jitter for Dierent Padding Techniques
It was seen that the regular VoIP sessions using linphone [22], sip communi-
cator [23] or twinkle [21] exhibit a jitter value between 0.06ms-0.08ms. For
cases of both RTP and SRTP, it was observed that the jitter values are well
within the permissible value of 0.5ms. It was also noted that max-random mode
and full-bandwidth mode add more jitter to the stream, while GAP technique,
burst padding and slight perturbation mode have jitter ranging between 0.1ms
- 0.13ms. This satisfactory jitter suggests that SQRKal is ecient in carrying
VoIP calls without addition of extra jitter.
2. Average Increase in size per packet
Increase in bandwidth due to padding can be roughly considered as the average
increase in packet size per RTP/SRTP packet. For every trace, we calculated
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the average increase in packet size per packet, and then took the mean of these
values for each padding technique. Fig. 20 depicts the distribution of the
increase in bandwidth.
Fig. 20. Average Increase in Packet Size per Packet
As expected, we have max-random and full bandwidth modes of operation
adding a huge amount of dummy data to the packets, thereby utilizing a high
bandwidth. On the contrary, since slight perturbation, dummy burst and GAP
add less amount of padding bytes, we see less increase of bandwidth for these
algorithms. This holds true for both RTP and SRTP.
3. CPU and Network Load
Experiments were run on a single-core CPU with Twinkle phone as the only
running application. In the rst case, we ran Twinkle with RTP option without
running SQRKal and found that the CPU load was in the range of 35%-40%.
This can be considered as a coarse-grained CPU utilization measure. Next,
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we ran Twinkle and SQRKal, and noticed that while SQRKal was eectively
padding the media stream, the CPU load was marginally increased to 38% to
40%. In case of SRTP, a similar observation was made. Fig. 21 and Fig. 22
depict the CPU load for RTP and SRTP packet padding respectively.
Fig. 21. CPU Load for RTP, with and without SQRKal
Fig. 22. CPU Load for SRTP, with and without SQRKal
As expected, SQRKal adds padding bytes to a packet, thereby increasing the
bandwidth usage. Fig. 23 compares the bandwidth usage for RTP when
SQRKal is not used, with the bandwidth usage when SQRKal is used with
max-random mode. It is seen that in the worst case, bandwidth usage increases
four-fold. Fig. 24 shows a similar comparison for SRTP packet padding.
43
Fig. 23. Network Load for RTP, with and without SQRKal
Fig. 24. Network Load for SRTP, with and without SQRKal
4. Mean-Opinion Score
Mean opinion score (MOS) provides a numerical indication of the perceived
quality of received media after transmission. The Mean-Opinion Score (MOS)
was calculated by asking listeners to rate the quality of a recorded audio for each
padding technique, on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the highest. MOS is the average
rating for each case and the results as shown in Table 1. Algorithms like GAP,
Burst Padding and Slight Perturbation have a very good MOS, suggesting that
the perceptive quality of the audio is not getting degraded.
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Table I. Mean Opinion Score
System MOS
Without SQRKal 3.33
With Full Bandwidth 3.00
With Max-Random 2.00
With Gradient Ascent Padding 3.33
With Burst Padding 3.66
With Slight Perturbation 4.00
5. Mutual information
We also measure certain information theoretic measures for each of the padding
technique to determine the best way of padding among them. Mutual informa-
tion is determined using a MATLAB toolbox called Information Theory Toolkit
v1.0 [18]. Fig. 25 represents the average value of mutual information for all the
traces in each padding technique.
Fig. 25. Mutual Information for RTP and SRTP with SQRKal
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It can be observed that mutual information is 0 for streams padded with full
bandwidth. Since the output packet size is constant, it can be intuitively de-
duced that inferring the input packet size from a constant output packet size
is not feasible. Likewise, it can be seen that mutual information is very less
for GAP technique, but is pretty high for slight-perturbation. It can be argued
that since we are adding small amount of stochasticity in the case of slight per-
turbation, there is high mutual dependance between the output packet size and
the input packet size.
6. Relative Entropy
Relative entropy between the input and output packet size distributions was
determined for each trace in each padding algorithm. Since the relative entropy
values varied from each other, we plot the cumulative distribution function of
Relative Entropy for each padding algorithm in g. 26.
It can be observed that there are values of high relative entropy when we con-
sider max-random padding algorithm. The other algorithms are not appreciably
dierent from each other. It can be safely assumed the eciency with respect
to Relative Entropy is not a great measure to distinguish between the given
padding algorithms.
All the results clearly favor the usage of the Gradual Ascent Padding algorithm,
because it adds less jitter to the packet stream, have considerably less mutual in-
formation between the output packet size and input packet size, have a satisfactory
increase in bandwidth usage and a satisfactory quality score.
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Fig. 26. C.D.F. of Relative Entropy for RTP and SRTP, with SQRKal
B. Determination of Output Packet Size Distribution
Statistical trac analysis attacks attempt to extract information about the input
packet sizes from the output packet size distribution. Our motivation is to ensure
maximum divergence between the output packet size distribution and the input packet
size distribution, such that trac analysis provides minimum information to the at-
tacker. We consider two probability mass distribution functions to be dierent from
each other if there exists minimum mutual information or maximum relative entropy
among them.
Let us say that an input stream of VoIP packets is morphed into an output
stream, such that the size of the output packet OPi is greater than the input packet
size IPi. There are n distinct packet sizes, s1; s2; s3; :::sn, for both input and output
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streams. The input packets have a packet size distribution p(S) and the output
packets have a packet size distribution q(S), where S represents the set of distinct
packet sizes.
We can ensure that it is unfeasible to infer p(S) from observations of q(S) using
the following methods:
 For every input packet size IPi, an output packet size OPi  [IPi;MPS] is
generated using a pseudo-random number generator, where MPS is the maxi-
mum allowed packet size or maximum transmission unit of the datagram. Most
pseudo-random number generators provide uniformly distributed output, and
intuitively we can say that a uniform output distribution makes it harder to
infer the input distribution from it.
 For every input packet size IPi, the output packet size OPi is calculated using
a one-way function such as a cryptographic hash function. The problem of
determining IPi from OPi becomes "unsolvable" in polynomial time.
 For every input packet size IPi, we calculate the optimum value for output
packet size OPi, such that it maximizes the relative entropy between the input
and output distributions.
C. Optimization of Relative Entropy
For the input packet size distribution p(S) and output packet size distribution q(S),
we have the relative entropy or K-L Divergence as:
D(pjjq) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log
p(S)
q(S)
(6.1)
When we receive an input packet IPi, we need to nd the output packet size OPi
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where D(qjjp) is maximum. This translates to the following optimization problem.
Maximize,
D(pjjq) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log
p(S)
q(S)
(6.2)
An output distribution consisting of all output packets padded to the maximum
packet size MPS will result in the maximum relative entropy at the cost of high band-
width usage. To ensure that padding does not exceptionally increase the bandwidth
usage, we must also minimize a distance measure between the output packet size and
input packet size for all packets.
In addition, the following constraints must also hold, since p(S) and q(S) must
be probability distributions:
nX
S=1
p(S) = 1 (6.3)
nX
S=1
q(S) = 1 (6.4)
(6.5)
Let us approach this optimization problem as an inductive process. We can
assume that initially we start with the output distribution as uniform, and as we
receive a subsequent input packet, we can calculate the optimal output packet size,
pad the output packet to the output size and send it forward.
When we receive input packet IPi, the input packet size distribution p(S) is
already known, since we have all the input packet sizes from IP0 to IPi. So, p(S) can
be considered to be a constant. The output packet sizes till i-1 i.e. OP0 to OPi 1 are
also known, and the output packet size distribution q(S) will be dependent on OPi.
Hence, the known values are:
1. p(S) 8S
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2. IPj 8j(0; i)
3. OPj 8j(0; i  1)
Equation 6.2 simplies to,
D(pjjq) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log p(S) 
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S)
Since the rst term
nX
S=1
p(S) log p(S) is a constant, we must minimize the second term
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S) in order to maximize D(pjjq).
So the problem can be simplied to,
Minimize
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S) and
increase in bandwidth usage.
1. Minimize the Dierence between Output Packet Size and Input Packet Size
If we specify the increase in bandwidth usage as the dierence between output packet
size and input packet size for every packet, we must minimize,
iX
j=0
(OPj   IPj)
The optimization problem now becomes,
Minimize,
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S) + (
iX
j=0
(OPj   IPj)), where  is a weight constant (6.6)
The only constraint is:
nX
S=1
q(S) = 0 (6.7)
Thus, after applying Lagrange Multiplier , the objective function can be stated as:
(q(S); OPj; ) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S) + (
iX
j=0
(OPj   IPj)) + (
nX
S=1
q(S)  1) (6.8)
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Since IPj is constant for all values of j and
iX
j=0
OPj can be expressed as
nX
S=1
(Sq(S)),
eq. 6.8 simplies to:
(q(S); ) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S)+
nX
S=1
(Sq(S)) k+(
nX
S=1
q(S)  1), where k = Pij=0 IPj
(6.9)
The following equations need to be solved:
@
@q(S)
= 0 (6.10)
@
@
= 0 (6.11)
Solving eq. 6.9 for all values of S, we have,
@
@q(s1)
= 0 (6.12)
@
@q(s2)
= 0 (6.13)
@
@q(s3)
= 0 (6.14)
...
...
@
@q(sn)
= 0 (6.15)
The above equations can be expanded as,
p(s1) + s1q(s1) + q(s1) = 0 (6.16)
p(s2) + s2q(s2) + q(s2) = 0 (6.17)
p(s3) + s3q(s3) + q(s3) = 0 (6.18)
...
...
p(sn) + snq(sn) + q(sn) = 0 (6.19)
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Each of the equations 6.16-6.19 can be simplied as:
q(si) =   p(si)
si + 
8i[1; n] (6.20)
Since
nX
S=1
q(S) = 1 (from eq. 6.7 and by solving eq. 6.11), the above set of equations
simplies to,
nX
i=1
p(si)
si + 
= 0 (6.21)
The value of  can be determined by solving the polynomial equation eq. 6.21.
Abel-Runi Theorem states that the solution of a polynomial equation of degree
equal to or greater than 5 cannot be expressed algebraically i.e. in radicals. But it
can be numerically determined using Groebner's basis or other methods. The output
size distribution with optimal relative entropy will then be determined using eq. 6.20.
2. Minimize the Square Distance between the Average Size of Output and Input
If we specify the increase in bandwidth usage as the square distance between the
average output size and average input size, we must minimize,
(
iX
j=0
OPj  
iX
j=0
IPj)
2
The optimization problem now becomes,
Minimize,
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S) + (
iX
j=0
OPj  
iX
j=0
IPj)
2, where  is a constant (6.22)
The only constraint here is:
nX
S=1
q(S) = 0 (6.23)
Thus, after applying Lagrange Multiplier , the objective function can be stated as:
(q(S); OPj; ) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S) + (
iX
j=0
OPj  
iX
j=0
IPj)
2 + (
nX
S=1
q(S)  1) (6.24)
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Since IPj is constant for all values of j and
iX
j=0
OPj can be expressed as
nX
S=1
(Sq(S)),
eq. 6.24 simplies to:
(q(S); ) =
nX
S=1
p(S) log q(S)+(
nX
S=1
(Sq(S)) k)2+(
nX
S=1
q(S)  1), where k = P IPj
(6.25)
The following equations are required to be solved:
@
@q(S)
= 0 (6.26)
@
@
= 0 (6.27)
Solving eq. 6.26 for all values of S, we have,
@
@q(s1)
= 0 (6.28)
@
@q(s2)
= 0 (6.29)
@
@q(s3)
= 0 (6.30)
...
...
@
@q(sn)
= 0 (6.31)
The above equations can be expanded as,
p(s1) + 2s1q(s1)(
nX
S=1
Sq(S)  k) + q(s1) = 0 (6.32)
p(s2) + 2s2q(s2)(
nX
S=1
Sq(S)  k) + q(s2) = 0 (6.33)
p(s3) + 2s3q(s3)(
nX
S=1
Sq(S)  k) + q(s3) = 0 (6.34)
...
...
p(sn) + 2snq(sn)(
nX
S=1
Sq(S)  k) + q(sn) = 0 (6.35)
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Taking X =
nX
S=1
Sq(S)  k, the equations 6.32-6.35 simplify to:
p(s1) + 2s1Xq(s1) + q(s1) = 0 (6.36)
p(s2) + 2s2Xq(s2) + q(s2) = 0 (6.37)
p(s3) + 2s3Xq(s3) + q(s3) = 0 (6.38)
...
...
p(sn) + 2snXq(sn) + q(sn) = 0 (6.39)
Each of the equations 6.36-6.39 can be simplied as:
q(si) =   p(si)
2siX + 
8i[1; n] (6.40)
Adding the equations 6.36-6.39, we get,
nX
S=1
p(S) + 2X(s1q(s1) + s2q(s2) + ::::+ snq(sn)) + (
nX
S=1
(q(S)) = 0 (6.41)
This equation simplies to X =
q
 +1
2
.
Hence, substituting the value of X in eq. 6.40, we get,
q(si) =   p(si)
si
q
 2(+ 1) + 
8i[1; n] (6.42)
Since
nX
S=1
q(S) = 1 (from eq. 6.7 and by solving eq. 6.27), the above set of equations
simplies to, X
siS
p(si)
si
q
 2(+ 1) + 
+ 1 = 0 (6.43)
The value of  can be determined by solving the polynomial equation eq. 6.43.
This cannot be solved algebraically but can be numerically determined using Groeb-
ner's basis or other methods. The output size distribution with optimal relative
entropy can then be determined by eq. 6.42.
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3. Specifying a Bandwidth Threshold
If we specify the bandwidth constraint with a specic bandwidth threshold B, then
the constraint as shown in eq. 6.44 will be also be considered.
iX
j=1
OPj
T
< B, where B is the bandwidth threshold and T is the total time. (6.44)
This optimization problem can be solved using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker or KKT
conditions and is beyond the scope of this study.
4. Results Using Matlab Optimization Toolbox
Since all the above cases fall under the domain of non-linear minimization problem,
we used the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox to nd the optimal output packet size
distribution. After specifying the respective objective function and the constraints,
we use the fmincon function to use the interior-point algorithm for non-linear min-
imization. This process is repeated for random start values and dierent types of
discrete distributions for the input packet size distribution p(S) and output packet
size distribution q(S).
Probability distribution tting was applied on the generated output distributions
using the dttool in MATLAB. 73% (24 from 30) of the optimal output distributions
were found to be uniform in nature, 33% were negative binomial distributions with
parameter r = 1 and the remaining belonged to the class of hypergeometric distri-
butions. The optimal output packet size distribution is most likely to be uniform in
nature. However, since MATLAB is unable to process input arrays of size greater than
70, this result is not entirely reliable, and this approach is not scalable in real-time.
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
A. Future Work
SRPP as an application-level padding protocol can be applied, leveraged or extended
in the following few scenarios:
 Implementation of SRPP on an appliance: This will allow VoIP calls made from
IP Phones and other hardware to be padded.
 Implementing new and existing padding algorithms in libSRPP, like morphing
algorithm.
 SQRKal implementation for Windows.
 VoIP Steganography using SRPP padding: SRPP Padding provides an eective
platform to hide data and send information within the padding bytes.
 Study of approximation algorithms or further heuristic measures to reduce mu-
tual information between input and output packet size distribution.
 Threat analysis study on utilizing SRPP timers to reveal identity of dummy
packets.
The above salient points can serve as proper avenues of carrying this work forward.
B. Conclusion
In this thesis, we have designed and implemented SRPP, a new RTP prole for secur-
ing Voice-over-IP trac from trac analysis attacks. It pads every RTP packet to a
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predened packet size, adds dummy packets at the end of every burst in a control-
lable way, adds dummy bursts to hide silence spurts, and hides information about the
packet inter-arrival timings. SRPP has been implemented as a library libSRPP for
use by VoIP application designers and as a standalone application named SQRKal
for use by regular users. A few practical approaches to padding were implemented,
and a mathematical approach to optimal padding was discussed. Implementation
of SQRKal and libSRPP was found to be eective and ecient, since SRPP adds
minimum jitter within the permissible amount of 0.5 ms and does not increase the
operational load on the CPU. It does increase the network bandwidth usage, but im-
plementation of a proper padding algorithm like Gradual Ascent Padding algorithm
minimizes that overhead as well. It is hoped that with a more robust and portable
implementation of SQRKal, SRPP will be readily accepted by the VoIP community.
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APPENDIX A
LIBSRPP API
VoIP application developers can use libSRPP to incorporate SRPP in their appli-
cations. The major functions of the libSRPP API are present in the header le
SRPP functions.h and can be listed as:
/***-------- Processing functions: --------------***/
// To initialize SRPP
int init_SRPP();
// To verify if SRPP has been disabled or not. Returns 0, if disabled
int SRPP_Enabled();
// To create a SRPP session
SRPPSession* create_session(string address, int port,
CryptoProfile crypto);
// To start the srpp session
int start_session();
int start_session(sdp_srpp sdp);
// To stop the srpp session
int stop_session();
void stop_abnormally(int i);
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// To start the SRPP Signaling process
int signaling();
// To convert a RTP packet to SRPP packet
SRPPMessage rtp_to_srpp(RTPMessage* rtp_msg);
SRPPMessage rtp_to_srpp(RTP_Header rtp_hdr, char* buf, int length);
// To convert a SRPP packet back to RTP packet
RTPMessage srpp_to_rtp(SRPPMessage* srpp_msg);
// To convert a SRTP packet to SRPP packet
SRPPMessage srtp_to_srpp(SRTPMessage* srtp_msg);
// To convert a SRPP packet back to SRTP packet
SRTPMessage srpp_to_srtp(SRPPMessage* srpp_msg);
int srpp_to_srtp(SRPPMessage * srpp_msg, char * buff,int length);
// To create a SRPP Message with the data and encrypt it.
SRPPMessage create_and_encrypt_srpp(string data);
// To create a SRPP Message and return it.
SRPPMessage create_srpp_message(string data);
// Only create a RTP Message and return it.
RTPMessage create_rtp_message(string data);
// Only create a SRTP Message and return it.
SRTPMessage create_srtp_message(string data);
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// To encrypt the given SRPP packet
SRPPMessage encrypt_srpp(SRPPMessage * original_pkt);
// To decrypt the given SRPP packet
SRPPMessage decrypt_srpp(SRPPMessage * encrypted_pkt);
// To get the padding functions object used here
PaddingFunctions* get_padding_functions();
// To get the current Session object
SRPPSession * get_session();
/***------------ Utility functions: --------------***/
// SRPP Pseudo-Random number between min and max
int srpp_rand(int min,int max);
// Used by the interior functions to send or receive a SRPP message
int send_message(SRPPMessage* msg);
SRPPMessage receive_message();
SRPPMessage processReceivedData(char * buff, int bytes_read);
// To set the Process Function (callback functions) which
// handle sending and receiving of a message.
int setSendFunctor(int (*process_func)(char*,int));
int setReceiveFunctor(SRPPMessage (*process_func)());
// To parse the received message. Returns -1 if its a media packet
// and 1 if its a signaling packet.
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int isSignalingMessage (SRPPMessage * message);
int isSignalingMessage (char * buff);
// To check or set whether the signaling is complete
int isSignalingComplete();
int setSignalingComplete();
// To check whether media session is complete
int isMediaSessionComplete();
int set_starting_sequenceno(int seq_no);
/***-------- END OF FILE --------------***/
64
APPENDIX B
MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS FOR MINIMIZATION OF MUTUAL
INFORMATION
Monte Carlo methods (or Monte Carlo experiments) are a class of computational
algorithms that rely on repeated random sampling to compute their results. First,
we dene a domain of inputs. Next, we generate inputs randomly , and perform a
computation on each input. Finally, we aggregate all the results into our nal result.
Our objective is to pad the original packets of size x to a new size y, such that the
mutual information (MI) [18] between distributions of y and x is minimum.
Observations based on minimum MI for all combinations of input-output distributions:
We ran a series of Monte-Carlo experiments, with the aim to nd out the combination
of probability distributions of x and y, for which we can get minimumMI. The skeleton
of this algorithm is as follows:
1. For a random number of experiments 'r', repeat steps 2-4.
2. Generate a random maximum packet size 'm' and a random number 'n'.
3. Generate random samples of length n from uniform, binomial, poisson and
geometric distributions for the discrete case and uniform, normal, exponential,
beta, gamma and chi-square distributions for continuous case. The parameters
to all these distributions are appropriately tuned, on the basis of 'm'. For e.x.
I generate uniform numbers in the range [1, m], and exponential numbers with
mean , such that  is a random number in the range [1, m].
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4. Calculate the mutual information between each of these samples, and nd the
combination of input-output distributions which has the minimum MI in this
experiment.
5. After all the 'r' experiments are complete, plot the combination of distributions
vs the number of experiments in which they had the minimum MI among all
the combinations.
The results, as shown in Fig. 27-28, were straightforward in the case of dis-
crete distributions. The minimum MI was found to be when both input and output
distributions were geometric in nature.
Fig. 27. Observations for Discrete Distributions (Run 1)
For continuous distributions, it was seen that beta or gamma distributions reduce
the MI when they are considered as the output distribution.
Observations based on individual input distributions: Next, we observed the optimal
distribution for specic cases of input distributions. It was observed that if the output
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Fig. 28. Observations for Discrete Distributions (Run 2)
is geometrically distributed, it had the minimum MI compared to the other output
distributions. For example, if the input is uniformly distributed, 165 experiments
where the output distribution was geometrical had the minimum MI, and this was
higher than all such other combinations. So, it is a good idea to simply transform any
discrete input distribution to geometric distribution, in order to minimize the mutual
information, based on these Monte Carlo experiments. Fig. 29-32 show the results
for various discrete input distributions.
In the case of continuous distributions, it was observed that for most of the runs
and for various input distributions, output distributions belonging to the beta or
gamma family had minimum MI most number of times, while exponential distribution
was a close second in some cases. From these Monte Carlo experiments, we can say
that for most of the distributions, it is a good idea to transform them to gamma or
beta distributions, while for gamma input distribution, we can also safely transform
it to exponential or uniform distribution as well.
67
Fig. 29. Discrete Case for Uniform Distribution
Fig. 30. Discrete Case for Binomial Distribution
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Fig. 31. Discrete Case for Poisson Distribution
Fig. 32. Discrete Case for Geometric Distribution
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All these Monte-Carlo experiments do not take into account the actual relation-
ship between the input packet size x and output packet size y, and therefore are not
very conclusive. These results can be used to formulate a padding algorithm, and its
eciency and eectiveness can be evaluated using SRPP.
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APPENDIX C
SCREENSHOTS OF WIRESHARK TRACES
Fig. 33-38 are screenshots of wireshark traces taken for SQRKal in various modes of
operation, which were used for evaluation of operations as described in Chapter VI.
Fig. 33. Wireshark Trace for non-SRPP supporting endpoint
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Fig. 34. Wireshark Trace for RTP max-random mode
Fig. 35. Wireshark Trace for RTP full-bandwidth mode
72
Fig. 36. Wireshark Trace for RTP Gradual Ascent Padding Algorithm
Fig. 37. Wireshark Trace for RTP Slight Perturbation Algorithm
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Fig. 38. Wireshark Trace for RTP with Dummy Bursts
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